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Energy increasingly constrains modern computer hardware, yet protecting
computations and data against errors costs energy. This holds at all scales, but
especially for the largest parallel computers being built and planned today. As
processor counts continue to grow, the cost of ensuring reliability consistently
throughout an application will become unbearable. However, many algorithms
only need reliability for certain data and phases of computation. This suggests
an algorithm and system codesign approach. We show that if the system lets ap-
plications apply reliability selectively, we can develop algorithms that compute
the right answer despite faults. These “fault-tolerant” iterative methods either
converge eventually, at a rate that degrades gracefully with increased fault rate,
or return a clear failure indication in the rare case that they cannot converge.
Furthermore, they store most of their data unreliably, and spend most of their
time in unreliable mode.
We demonstrate this for the specific case of detected but uncorrectable mem-
ory faults, which we argue are representative of all kinds of faults. We developed
a cross-layer application / operating system framework that intercepts and re-
ports uncorrectable memory faults to the application, rather than killing the
application, as current operating systems do. The application in turn can mark
memory allocations as subject to such faults. Using this framework, we wrote a
fault-tolerant iterative linear solver using components from the Trilinos solvers
library. Our solver exploits hybrid parallelism (MPI and threads). It performs
just as well as other solvers if no faults occur, and converges where other solvers
do not in the presence of faults. We show convergence results for representative
test problems. Near-term future work will include performance tests.
1 Introduction
Computational scientists tend to think of computer systems as reliable digital
devices. Decades of experience confirmed this view, because any faults that did
occur were infrequent enough that hardware or system software fault detection
and correction schemes could handle them. However, many system design-
ers predict that reliability will decline on future computers, especially for very
high-end computers built of millions of components [30, 24]. This is because
current and future hardware is energy constrained. All hardware or software
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methods for improving reliability require energy, because they all involve redun-
dant storage and computation. This includes redundant data encoding (such as
Reed-Solomon codes), and redundant arithmetic computation in space or time.
Extreme-scale hardware is particularly energy constrained, and its large number
of components makes the failure of any one of them more likely, increasing the
demands on fault detection and correction. There are many efforts in the hard-
ware development community to understand these issues, for example [14, 47].
Some studies already indicate that faults are appearing at the user level [19].
However, without fault detection in the user code, these faults are not always
noticed, even though they may lead to incorrect results.
Most existing approaches to fault-tolerant algorithm development assume
that a fault can occur at any time during program execution. In this paper we
explore the use of variable reliability to develop algorithms that perform most
computations using a less reliable computing mode, but perform some compu-
tations in a special, more highly-reliable environment. Using this approach, we
show that with modest modifications, common iterative methods can exhibit
reliable behavior even if faults occur during the computation. Furthermore, we
believe this basic approach can be applied to many classes of algorithms such
that, by performing a small fraction of an algorithm’s computations in highly-
reliable mode, we can continue to make progress in our computations in the
presence of some system unreliability.
Both hardware and system software architects must take ever more extreme
measures to maintain the illusion of reliability with increasingly unreliable hard-
ware. Yet, many algorithms do not need this level of reliability everywhere.
Reducing energy requirements for future computers requires an algorithm /
system codesign approach. We are using this research as a model to improve
collaboration between these two fields.
2 Related work
Fault-tolerant algorithms have long been a topic of research. In numerical linear
algebra, most fall within the category of algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT)
(see e.g., [23]). Such approaches are interesting research, but often do not fully
address the needs of applications. In particular, ABFT methods attempt to
detect faults during the execution of some function such as a solver, and then
recover solver state via metadata collected during execution or basic mathe-
matical properties known about the algorithm. However, such approaches are
impractical since solver state is only one portion of the total application state.
If application state is not also recovered, the solver state is irrelevant. Further-
more, solver state is easily regenerated if application state is recovered. As a
result, ABFT methods are not presently used in applications as far as we know.
ABFT methods can become relevant if we can finally have in place the vertically
integrated resilience capabilities mentioned in the context of hard fault situa-
tions. In this situation, faults detected and resolved in the solver can remain
relevant if the application has also managed to recover its corresponding state.
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Other authors have empirically investigated the behavior of iterative solvers
when soft faults occur (e.g., [10, 22]), developed an approximate restart scheme
for recovering from the loss of a node’s data [27], or even developed more energy-
conserving hardware cache error correction schemes, based on observations of
iterative methods’ cache use [29]. “Asynchronous” or “chaotic” iterations (see
e.g., [3] for a bibliography) are linear solvers designed to tolerate message delays
when applying the matrix in parallel, for certain classes of matrices. However, as
far as we know, no one has yet developed iterative solver algorithms specifically
to handle soft faults in computations and data.
3 Fault characterization
In this paper, we use fault to mean an abnormal operating condition of the com-
puter system, which affects a running routine (in this case a linear solver) in
some way. The routine fails only when one or more faults causes it to compute
the wrong answer. That is, faults occur inside a routine; failure refers to the
routine’s output, which does not meet the caller’s success criteria. This distinc-
tion between faults and failures is a simplified version of the multilevel model
of software reliability presented in [31]. This definition nests: for example, if a
nonlinear solver calls a linear solver repeatedly, the linear solver may produce
a solution with residual norm greater than the caller’s tolerance (i.e., “fail”) on
occasion, but the nonlinear solver may still converge. Thus, failure from the
linear solver’s perspective may be a fault but not a failure from the nonlinear
solver’s perspective. The rest of this paper considers faults and failures from the
linear solver’s perspective. We leave studies of algorithms that consume linear
solvers’ output (such as nonlinear solvers, optimization algorithms, and implicit
methods for solving time-dependent systems of ordinary differential equations)
for future work.
In this paper, we give two classifications of faults. The first is hard vs. soft :
• Hard faults: Cause program interruption and are outside the scope of
what the executable program can directly detect. These faults can result
from hardware failure or from data integrity faults that lead to an incorrect
execution path.
• Soft faults: Do not cause immediate program interruption and are de-
tectable via introspection by user code. Soft faults occur as “bit flips”
such as incorrect floating point or integer data, or perhaps incorrect ad-
dress values that still point to valid user data space. Although it is difficult
to detect all soft faults, some modest amount of introspection can be very
effective at dramatically reducing their impact.
An example of a hard fault would be the operating system crashing, causing
the program to stop executing. (This would not be a failure if the system then
restarts the program from a checkpoint, and the program completes and pro-
duces the correct answer.) In our experience, detecting and recovering from
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hard faults requires a concerted effort from all levels of the hardware and soft-
ware stack. Although there may be algorithmic research required for this effort,
the primary need is to determine roles, responsibilities and protocols for com-
municating between layers. This activity is underway in some layers, but is only
starting to be addressed in a comprehensive way.
Fault
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Transient Sticky Persistent
Abnormal
operation
Failure
Relative to current 
level of abstraction.
A fault happens inside a function.
It may or may not produce correct
output as a result.
A failure is a fault that 
"leaks out," so the function
misbehaves from an
outside perspective.
"Soft" faults do not interrupt the 
program immediately.  User code 
can detect them via introspection. "Hard" faults interrupt the program.
The program that suffers them
cannot detect them directly.
Dotted outline: 
Beyond our 
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Figure 1: Classification of faults. Hard faults are outside the scope of our effort.
We address soft faults in several ways.
The second characterization applies only to soft faults, and describes their
temporal behavior:
• Persistent fault: The incorrect bit pattern will not change as execu-
tion proceeds. Example: The primary source of a data value (and any
subsequent copies) are incorrect, so there is no ability to restore correct
state.
• Sticky fault: The incorrect bit pattern can be corrected by direct action.
Example: A backup source for the data exists and can be used to restore
correct state.
• Transient fault: The incorrect pattern occurs temporarily. Example:
Data in a cache is incorrect, but the correct value is still present in main
memory and the cache value is flushed.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the two characterizations of faults.
4
3.1 Potential for Soft Fault Detection and Correction
Although recovering from hard faults requires a coordinated effort across soft-
ware and hardware layers, at least some soft faults can be effectively detected
and corrected by user code. Furthermore, practically speaking, some applica-
tions spend much of their computation time in a small portion of the total
program lines of code. Such applications can benefit from introducing fault-
oriented introspection into that portion of the software. This situation occurs
frequently in applications that generate and solve large linear systems of equa-
tions. In many cases, 80% or more of the computation time is spent in the linear
solver. As problem sizes and processor counts increase, the solver can take more
than 99% of the total execution time [28]. If we can incorporate introspection
into the solvers for these cases, we can dramatically reduce the impact of soft
faults.
One of the challenges for future system designers is determining how much
fault resilience should be designed into the system. Historically, hardware and
system architects have been very aggressive in capturing faults, so much so that
users rarely experience a fault during normal system use. In the future, such
approaches may be too expensive, resulting in a default reliability that must
always be scrutinized. With this in mind, we introduce the concept of high vs.
bulk reliability:
• Bulk reliability: The default reliability exhibited by system in normal
execution mode. As system feature sizes shrink and component counts
increase, we expect that bulk reliability will decrease to the point where
users will need to pay attention to potential errors.
• High reliability: A special, presumably software-enabled mode, such
that the user can declare data storage regions, data paths and execution
regions that have better than bulk reliability.
Presently most algorithms lack robustness in the presence of soft faults. A
single soft fault will not be detected and will eventually result in catastrophic
failure. Assuming we have high reliability mechanisms in future programming
environments, we have new opportunities for redesigning algorithms. Specifi-
cally, we seek algorithm designs such that decay in progress is proportional to
the number of soft faults, at least in practice.
In this paper we focus on preconditioned iterative methods, and particularly
on variants of GMRES (the Generalized Minimal Residual method [37]). We
do so because, as we mentioned, many applications spend the vast majority
of execution time in the solver, and GMRES is one of the most robust and
popular methods for challenging problems. However, the approach we use is
applicable to many algorithms. In fact, we believe that most, and maybe all,
algorithms can eventually have fault-resilient formulations that introduce a very
small runtime overhead while practically achieving the convergence equivalent
to doing all computations in high reliability mode.
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4 Models of reliability
In this section, we describe models of reliability that fault-tolerant numerical
algorithms could use. The main goal of these models is to help algorithm devel-
opers reason about the quality of the computed solution. Without the promise
of reliability for selected data and computations, no implementation of an al-
gorithm can promise anything about the final result. Thus, all the models we
propose in this section allow programmers to demand reliability as needed, and
to allow data and control to flow between reliable and unreliable parts of the
program.
A second goal of our reliability models is to convert hard faults into soft
faults whenever our algorithms can handle the latter effectively. Reliability
models govern the distinction between hard and soft faults. For example, the
fail-stop model ensures that either the data and computations are reliable, or the
program terminates with minimal side effects; it tries to turn all soft faults into
hard faults. Current numerical algorithms assume a fail-stop model, which we
assert can be relaxed in many cases. As long as algorithms can deal with soft
faults without a large time-to-solution penalty, reducing the number of hard
faults will improve performance by avoiding restarts and allowing reduction
of the checkpoint frequency. It may even improve reliability, for example by
avoiding the catastrophic situation of a second hard fault during recovery from
one hard fault.
We begin in Section 4.1 by asking whether statistics could help us avoid
considering models of reliability, and showing that it does not. Section 4.2
describes the “sandbox” model, which is the most general reliability model our
fault-tolerant algorithms can use. The algorithm presented in Section 6 can
work even in this model, but finer-grained models will allow us to define its
convergence behavior more precisely. Therefore, we conclude with some desired
features of finer-grained models in Section 4.3.
4.1 Statistical “model”
Increasingly numerical simulations use statistical techniques to account for un-
certainty in the data as well as in the mathematical model. Many people refer
to the study of representing and quantifying such uncertainties as uncertainty
quantification (UQ). It seems reasonable that we also could apply these tech-
niques to account for possibly unreliable solves, that is, “roll up” the solver’s
uncertainty in that of the application itself. This would not require new solver
algorithms or implementations. Instead, the problem would be solved multiple
times using existing solvers, and statistics would be used to remove “outliers”
and identify the most “believable” solution. This would comprise a “model” of
reliability based on statistical belief, rather than on any guarantees made by
the system or solver.
This “model” is no model of reliability at all. It implicitly assumes that faults
may only occur in the solver, and that the statistical analysis that identifies the
most believable solution is free of faults. In fact, these assumptions define the
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“sandbox” model of reliability described in the next section (4.2). Neverthe-
less, one might consider using statistical analysis to improve fault tolerance,
in combination with a satisfactory fault model. We do not think this should
be applied na¨ıvely to existing fault-intolerant solvers, for two reasons. First, it
may require running many solves to get statistical confidence. Second, it would
throw away what numerical analysts have learned about how iterative solvers
respond to certain kinds of faults. For example, perturbing the matrix A affects
convergence of iterative solvers more in earlier iterations than in later iterations
(see Section 6.3). Finally, we will show in this paper that iterative methods
can be modified to tolerate some soft faults, for much less cost than running
a fault-intolerant solver many times. We do not dismiss statistical approaches
completely, though. In particular, they may be useful to enhance detection of
faults when invoking a solver. As we discuss in Section 7.3, our fault-tolerant
inner-outer iteration can save some fault recovery work if it can detect faults
reliably in the inner solves.
4.2 Sandbox model
Relaxing reliability of all data and computations may result in all manner of
undesirable and unpredictable behavior. If instructions, pointers, array indices,
and boolean values used for decisions may change arbitrarily at any time, we
cannot assert anything about the results of a computation or the side effects of
the program, even if it runs to completion without abnormal termination. The
least we can do is force the fault-susceptible program to execute in a sandbox.
This is a general idea from computer security, that allows the execution of
untrusted “guest” code in a partition of the computer’s state (the “sandbox”)
that protects the rest of the computer (the “host”) from the guest’s possibly
bad behavior. Sandboxing can even protect the host against malicious code that
aims to corrupt the system’s state, so it can certainly handle code subject to
unintentional faults in data and instructions.
Sandboxes ensure isolation of a possibly unreliable phase of execution. They
allow data to flow between reliable and unreliable phases of execution. Also, they
let the host force guest code to stop within a predefined finite time, or if the
host suspects the guest may have wandered astray. This feature is especially im-
portant in distributed-memory computation for preventing deadlock and other
failures due to “crashed” or unresponsive nodes. In general, sandboxing con-
verts some kinds of hard faults into soft faults, and limits the scope of soft faults
to the guest subprogram.
Sandboxing may be implemented in different ways. For example, the guest
may run in a virtual machine on the same hardware as the host. (See Smith and
Nair [41] or Rosenblum [33] for accessible overviews of past and recent virtual
machine technology.) Alternately, the guest may even run on separate hardware
from the host program. For example, guests may run on a fast but unreliable
subsystem, and the controlling host program may run on a reliable but slower
subsystem.
Here is an example of the sandbox model in operation. In this example, the
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guest program is responsible for computing sparse matrix-vector products. It
receives a vector x from the host, computes y := A · x (where A is the sparse
matrix), and returns y to the host. The vectors x and y on the host are stored
and computed with reliably. The guest makes no promises about the correctness
of the values in the vector y it returns. It may even return different values for
the same x input each time it is invokes. However, the sandbox ensures that
the guest returns in finite time. (For example, it may kill the guest process if
it takes too long, and return some arbitrary solution vector if the guest did not
complete its computation.)
The fault-tolerant inner-outer iteration we will describe in Section 6 uses
the sandbox model. There, the guest program performs the task “Solve a given
linear system.” The host program invokes the guest repeatedly for different
right-hand sides, and the host performs its own calculations reliably. See that
section for details. Finer-grained models of reliability may improve accuracy
of the inner solves, so we now go on to describe some desired features of these
models.
4.3 Desired features of finer-grained models
The sandbox model of reliability makes only two promises of the unreliable
guest: it returns something (which may not be correct), and it completes in
fixed time. These already suffice to construct a working fault-tolerant iterative
method, as we will show in Section 6. However, detecting faults or being able
to limit how faults may occur would also be useful. All of these are more
sophisticated forms of introspection. These finer-grained models of reliability
can be used to improve accuracy of the iterative method, or to prove more
specific promises about its convergence. We describe some of these below.
4.3.1 Detection
Knowing that no faults occurred in a bulk-reliability phase of execution can
avoid robustness and recovery effort in the highly reliable phase. We discuss
this more in Section 6 in the context of our inner-outer iteration. In general, if we
know that the potentially unreliable inner solver experienced no faults, we know
that its computed intermediate state (e.g., the Krylov subspace basis) is correct.
We can then safely use that state to accelerate the next invocation of the inner
solver. Fault detection is therefore a valuable feature of a reliability model, even
without fault recovery. Many error-correcting storage schemes, such as those in
DRAM memory, caches, and redundant disk storage, can detect more kinds of
errors than those which they can correct. Extending those storage schemes to be
able to correct those additional detectable errors requires additional hardware,
energy consumption, and computation. Thus, if algorithms can exploit fault
detection to handle faults efficiently, they can relieve hardware of the burden of
recovery.
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4.3.2 Transience
Faults should look as transient as possible. For example, consider solving the
sparse linear system Ax = b iteratively. If faults in the entries of A persist
throughout the iterative method, the method will be solving the wrong linear
system A˜x = b. Worse yet, the algorithm will report that the computed approx-
imate solution x˜ has a small residual norm ‖b− A˜x˜‖, even though x˜ may be far
from the actual solution. In contrast, many iterative methods naturally tolerate
some kinds of occasional transient faults, so unreliable computations with only
transient faults can still be useful. Indeed, before reliable electronic computers,
the only “computers” were unreliable human beings. They could nevertheless
solve real-world problems, because human faults are usually transient. (This is
why, when balancing a checkbook by hand, it helps to repeat the process until
one gets the same result more than once.)
Many hardware faults are not transient. This is particularly true of DRAM
memory faults, as described for example in Schroeder et al. [38]. Permanent
faults (which Schroeder et al. call “hard errors”) due to hardware failures are
much more common than temporary faults. The so-called “chip-kill” DRAM
error-correcting code (see Asanovic et al. [1]) was designed for the common
case of an entire DRAM module failing permanently and producing incorrect
values. In many cases, permanent faults interrupt a running program or even
make the node fail, and are thus beyond the ability of an application to de-
tect. That is, they are “hard faults” (see Section 3). However, applications
may be able to detect and respond to these malfunctions as they first begin.
Furthermore, “temporary” single-bit faults may persist and accumulate into
multiple-bit faults, which some error-correcting codes cannot correct. Eliminat-
ing correctible faults before they become uncorrectible requires special measures
(a “memory scrubber”) that may increase energy consumption and reduce avail-
able memory bandwidth.
This means the implementation of the reliability model likely will have to
do extra work to give the appearance of transience. In terms of Section 3,
the implementation must turn “persistent” faults into “sticky” or “transient”
faults. For example, unreliable memory storing the sparse matrix A could be
refreshed every few iterations from a reliable backing store. Physical memory
pages showing incorrect values during the refresh may be retired and replaced
with other physical pages. The reliable backing store approach is also useful
for checkpointing, and could be implemented with fast local storage (like flash
memory).
4.3.3 Type system model
Consider implementing sparse matrix-vector multiply (the example of Section
4.2) as the guest program in the unreliable sandbox. If the guest can be arbi-
trarily unreliable, the sandbox has to do a lot of work to protect the host from
things like invalid instructions (due to errors in instructions) or out-of-bounds
array accesses (due to errors in index data). The sandbox could be much sim-
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pler if, for example, only the entries of the sparse matrix and vectors, and the
floating-point computations with the matrix and vector values, are allowed to
experience errors. This restriction would also make it easier for programmers to
reason about what happens in code running inside the sandbox, so they would
not need to write many redundant-looking checks that make code hard to read
and maintain.
This example suggests a finer-grained programming model, in which de-
velopers can decide which data and computations they want to be reliable or
unreliable, and mix the two in their program. For safety and ease of use, the
default behavior of all data and computations should be as close to fail-stop
reliability as possible. (That is, either the data and computations are reliable,
or the program terminates.) Programmers may then relax reliability for certain
data, or certain phases of computation, or both.1 In the above example, fail-stop
default reliability ensures correctness of the sparse matrix indices and the sparse
matrix-vector multiply routine, so the routine will not crash the entire program.
This programming model is more demanding than the sandbox model, because
it complicates the ways in which reliable and unreliable computations and data
may interact.
We are currently exploring a special case of this model, in which program-
mers can allocate “unreliable memory” by calling a special version of C’s malloc
routine. The operating system records and reports to the application any de-
tected but uncorrectible memory faults in memory areas marked unreliable,
but it does not kill the process that allocated this memory, as many operating
systems do for ordinary memory allocations. We believe this programming in-
terface - based approach will work for special cases of faults. However, we think
the best way to generalize this reliability model for all kinds of faults in different
hardware components would be to encode reliability in the type system of the
programming language, much as existing type systems encode the precision of
floating-point values or whether an object should be protected from simultane-
ous access by multiple threads. We do not require new programming language
features for the numerical methods proposed in this paper, but we think it would
make designing and implementing fault-tolerant algorithms much easier.
Encoding reliability in the type system is not a new idea. Chen et al. [13]
observe that different data in different algorithms may need different levels of
storage reliability, and that reliability costs energy, space, performance, or some
combination of them. They propose programmer annotations for declaring re-
liability of subsets of multidimensional arrays. For the simple case of nested
for loops over the arrays, they then use compiler analysis to derive what parts
of the arrays should be stored reliably. Our suggested “reliability on demand”
feature is also a kind of programmer annotation. However, it applies to en-
tire data structures and computations, rather than subsets of arrays. Chen et
al. require complicated compiler analysis of loops to derive the reliable regions
of arrays and generate separate reliable and unreliable code. Our annotations
1Note that assuming a policy of default reliability and explicit unreliability does not con-
tradict our characterization of bulk vs. high reliability. It simply makes annotation easier.
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would depend only on simple type declarations and compiler analysis, analo-
gous to that already performed by compilers when combining values of different
floating-point precisions.
4.3.4 Reliable parallel decisions
Parallel computing introduces new ways in which soft faults can turn into hard
faults. For example, if the contents of messages between nodes of a distributed-
memory computer may become corrupted, then different nodes may get different
results in an all-reduce, even if each node computes its part of the all-reduce
reliably. Many distributed-memory implementations of iterative methods use
the result of an all-reduce in a predicate that tells the method when to stop
iterating (for example, when the residual norm is less than some tolerance).
The predicate is computed redundantly on each node, with the expectation
that all nodes will get the same result. If they do not – for example, if they
have different values for the residual norm – then some nodes may stop iterating
while others continue. This can result in deadlock or application failure, that is,
it can turn a soft fault into a hard fault. We would prefer that parallel decisions
like this one be reliable.
This is not a new problem; Blackford et al. [8] discuss it in the less extreme
context of heterogeneous clusters, where different processors may have differ-
ent floating-point properties and thus may evaluate floating-point comparisons
differently. They recommend in this case that one processor compute the stop-
ping criterion and broadcast the Boolean result to all other processors. This
would only solve the reliability problem for convergence tests if Boolean-valued
messages cannot be corrupted or lost. In our case, it would be simpler, and
probably no more costly, to require the original all-reduce and the predicate
evaluation to be reliable and produce the same result on all nodes.
A different approach would be to observe that the stopping criterion is a
special case of distributed agreement on a Boolean value. This is an instance
of the thoroughly studied Byzantine Generals Problem (Lamport et al. [26]),
for which practical solution algorithms exist (see e.g., Castro and Liskov [12]).
This problem assumes that some of the entities participating in distributed
agreement may intentionally attempt to deceive the others, which is an extreme
but valid generalization of corrupted data and arithmetic on some processors.
In practice, simple distributed agreement schemes should suffice. For example,
an implementation could augment the all-reduce input for the convergence test
with a simple integer variable which each processor would set to one if it has
reached convergence. Then all processors would declare convergence if the sum
of these integer values was greater than some portion of the total processors
being used. Alternately, it may be simpler just to assume high reliability for all
distributed-memory transactions. For example, practically speaking, the cost of
an all-reduce is dominated by latency (or even just the fact that the message is
transmitted off the node), so adding reliability by computing redundantly or by
adding error detection and correction metadata to the all-reduce data package
is almost free.
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5 Desired properties of fault-tolerant iterations
Fault-tolerant iterative methods should have certain properties in order to be
both useful and feasible to implement. In this section, we describe a few desired
properties, and explain which make sense to implement. Section 5.1 introduces
two desired convergence properties – eventual convergence and gradual degrada-
tion of convergence – and argues for eventual convergence as the most reasonable
criterion. Section 5.2 discusses properties of implementations of these methods
that will help them achieve good performance, with minimal changes to existing
solver algorithms and implementations. These criteria will help us narrow the
space of possible algorithms.
5.1 Convergence-related properties
We call what we see as the most important property eventual convergence: If a
comparable but not fault-tolerant method would converge to the right answer
in the case of no faults, the fault-tolerant solver should either converge to the
right answer in a finite number of steps, or tell the caller that it did not. The
fault-tolerant method may require more iterations or otherwise take more time,
and it might also have an upper bound on the number or magnitude of faults it
can tolerate. One iterative method that does not have the eventual convergence
property is iterative refinement (an algorithm first described by Wilkinson [45]).
Given sufficiently large faults, only one fault in the residual vector need happen
at the “last iteration” for iterative refinement never to compute the right answer.
Without eventual convergence, it would not be worthwhile to relax hardware
reliability, since all the effort at previous iterations might be wasted by a single
fault. It is often impossible to know when an fault will occur in a particular
component, so a reasonable method should allow them to occur at any time. The
algorithm we present in Section 6 does have the eventual convergence property.
Gradual degradation of convergence as the number of faults increases would
also be desirable. This might be much harder to guarantee than eventual con-
vergence. For example, consider an explicit Petrov-Galerkin projection method
for solving the n × n system Ax = b, that adds basis vectors to two different
bases Vk = [v1, . . . , vk] and Wk = [w1, . . . , wk]. Implementing a method mathe-
matically equivalent to GMRES, for instance, would require R (Vk) = span{r0,
Ar0, . . . , A
k−1 r0} and R (Wk) = AR (Vk). If the matrix-vector products were
unreliable, we could still extend the basis in every iteration by adding a random
basis vector and orthogonalizing it against the previous basis vectors, if the
basis vectors are computed reliably. In the worst case, this unreliable method
would not converge until R (Wk) spans the entire space, that is, on iteration
n − 1. In fact, GMRES cannot promise better than this even in the case of
no faults. It is possible to construct n × n problems for which the residual in
ordinary GMRES does not decrease until iteration n−1, or for which the resid-
ual exhibits any desired nonincreasing convergence curve [18]. Some real-life
linear systems exhibit almost no convergence until some number of iterations,
after which they converge rapidly. This suggests that eventual convergence is a
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more reasonable goal than gradual degradation of convergence. We will show in
the numerical experiments in Section 8 that our FT-GMRES algorithm exhibits
gradual degradation of convergence in practice. It may do so in theory also,
though we do not attempt in this paper to prove this.
5.2 Implementation-related properties
We have already discussed different models of application-controlled reliabil-
ity in Section 4. Making all data and arithmetic reliable would trivially result
in a fault-tolerant iterative method. However, all of our models assume that
reliability has a cost, which is some combination of additional energy or stor-
age and reduced performance. Thus, a fault-tolerant algorithm should aim to
store most of its data and spend most of its computations in unreliable mode.
Second, fault-tolerant algorithms should not be too much slower than corre-
sponding less tolerant algorithms. It is reasonable to expect that the longer
an application runs, the more faults it will likely encounter. More faults mean
either slower convergence, which compounds the problem, or even solver failure.
If the fault-tolerant method is too slow, it may be faster just to run a less tol-
erant method over and over using an ensemble approach until the majority of
answers agree. Finally, fault-tolerant methods should reuse existing algorithms
and implementations as much as possible. In particular, they should accept
existing preconditioner algorithms, and ideally even existing implementations.
Preconditioners are often complicated and specific to their application. Our
inner-outer iteration in Section 6 can call existing iterative solvers and their
preconditioners as a “black box,” as long as they promise to terminate within
a fixed time.2
6 Fault-Tolerant GMRES
This section describes the Fault-Tolerant GMRES (FT-GMRES) algorithm, a
Krylov subspace method for iterative solution of large sparse linear systems
Ax = b. FT-GMRES computes the correct solution x even if the system experi-
ences uncorrected faults in both data and arithmetic [21]. It promises “eventual
convergence” in the sense of Section 5.1: it will always either converge to the
right answer, or (in rare cases) stop and report immediately to the caller if it
cannot make progress. FT-GMRES accomplishes this by dividing its computa-
tions into reliable and unreliable phases, using the sandbox model of reliability
described in Section 4.2. Rather than rolling back any faults that occur in un-
reliable phases, as a checkpoint / restart approach would do, FT-GMRES “rolls
forward” through any faults in unreliable phases, and uses the reliable phases
to drive convergence. FT-GMRES can also exploit fault detection in order to
correct corrupted data during unreliable phases.
2Guaranteeing fixed-time termination when distributed-memory messages may be unreli-
able may require some modifications to existing sparse matrix-vector multiply and precondi-
tioner implementations, but not to the mathematical algorithms.
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6.1 FT-GMRES is based on Flexible GMRES
Algorithm 1 (Right-preconditioned) GMRES
Input: Linear system Ax = b and initial guess x0
Output: Approximate solution xm for some m ≥ 0
1: r0 := b−Ax0 . Unpreconditioned initial residual vector
2: β := ‖r0‖2
3: q1 := r0/β
4: for j = 1, 2, . . . until convergence do
5: Solve qj = Mzj for zj . Apply preconditioner
6: vj+1 := Azj . Apply the matrix A
7: for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do . Orthogonalize
8: H(i, j) := q∗i vj+1
9: vj+1 := vj+1 − qiH(i, j)
10: end for
11: H(j + 1, j) := ‖vj+1‖2
12: qj+1 := vj+1/H(j + 1, j) . New basis vector
13: yj := argminy ‖H(1 : j + 1, 1 : j)y − βe1‖2
14: xj := x0 +M
−1[q1, q2, . . . , qj ]yj . Compute solution update
15: end for
FT-GMRES is based on Flexible GMRES (FGMRES) [34], shown here as
Algorithm 2. FGMRES extends the Generalized Minimal Residual (GMRES)
method of Saad and Schultz [37], by “flexibly” allowing the preconditioner to
change in every iteration. We show standard right-preconditioned GMRES as
Algorithm 1 for comparison. An important motivation of flexible methods are
“inner-outer iterations,” which use an iterative method itself as the precondi-
tioner. In this case, “solve qj := Mjzj” (Line 5 of Algorithm 2) means “solve
the linear system Azj = qj approximately using a given iterative method.” This
inner solve step preconditions the outer solve (in this case the FGMRES flexible
iteration). Changing right-hand sides and possibly changing stopping criteria
for each inner solve mean that if one could express the “inner solve operator”
as a matrix, it would be different on each invocation. This is why inner-outer
iterations require a flexible outer solver.
Flexible methods need not use an iterative method for the inner solves. The
Mj may be arbitrary functions from the range of A to the domain of A. Most
importantly, the preconditioners may change significantly from one iteration to
another; flexible methods do not depend on the difference between successive
preconditioners being small. This is the key observation behind FT-GMRES:
flexible iterations allow successive inner solves to differ arbitrarily, even un-
boundedly. This suggests modeling faulty inner solves as “different precondi-
tioners.” Taking this suggestion leads to FT-GMRES, which we present in the
next section.
Flexible inner-outer iterations have the property that the dimension of the
Krylov subspace from which they choose the current approximate solution grows
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Algorithm 2 Flexible GMRES (FGMRES)
Input: Linear system Ax = b and initial guess x0
Output: Approximate solution xm for some m ≥ 0
1: r0 := b−Ax0 . Unpreconditioned initial residual
2: β := ‖r0‖2
3: q1 := r0/β
4: for j = 1, 2, . . . until convergence do
5: Solve qj = Mjzj . Apply current preconditioner
6: vj+1 := Azj . Apply the matrix A
7: for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do . Orthogonalize
8: H(i, j) := q∗i vj+1
9: vj+1 := vj+1 − qiH(i, j)
10: end for
11: H(j + 1, j) := ‖vj+1‖2
12: Update rank-revealing decomposition of H(1:j, 1:j)
13: if H(j + 1, j) is less than some tolerance then
14: if H(1:j, 1:j) not full rank then
15: Did not converge; report error
16: else
17: Return at end of this iteration . Discovered invariant subspace
18: end if
19: else
20: qj+1 := vj+1/H(j + 1, j)
21: end if
22: yj := argminy ‖H(1:j + 1, 1:j)y − βe1‖2
23: xj := x0 + [z1, z2, . . . , zj ]yj . Compute solution update
24: end for
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at each outer iteration [39], as long as the break-down condition mentioned above
does not occur. This ensures eventual convergence. Corresponding restarted
Krylov methods lack this property; their convergence may stagnate. Even
though this property of inner-outer iterations may not hold in the case of faulty
inner solves, the numerical experiments in Section 8 show that inner-outer it-
erations offer better fault tolerance than simply restarting. Both restarting
and inner-outer iterations correspond naturally to the sandbox reliability model
when the number of iterations per restart cycle resp. inner solve is fixed.
There are flexible versions of other iterative methods besides GMRES, such
as CG [17] and QMR [43], which could also be used as the outer solver. We chose
FGMRES because it is easy to implement, robust, and can handle nonsymmetric
linear systems. Experimenting with other flexible outer iterations is future work.
6.1.1 Flexible GMRES’ additional failure mode
FGMRES has an additional failure mode beyond those of standard GMRES.
The quantity H(j + 1, j) = 0 does not necessarily indicate convergence, as it
would in standard GMRES. This is because H(1:j, 1:j) is always nonsingular in
GMRES if j is the smallest iteration index for which H(j + 1, j) = 0, whereas
H(1:j, 1:j) may not be nonsingular in FGMRES in that case. (This is Saad’s
Proposition 2.2 [34].) This can happen even in exact arithmetic. For example, it
may occur due to unlucky choices of the preconditioners: for example, M−1j = A
and M−1j+1 = A
−1. In practice, this case is rare, even when inner solves are
subject to faults. Furthermore, it can be detected inexpensively, since there are
algorithms for updating a rank-revealing decomposition of an m × m matrix
in O(m2) time (see e.g., Stewart [42]). This is no more time than it takes to
update the QR factorization of the upper Hessenberg matrix at iteration m.
The ability to detect this rank deficiency ensures “trichotomy” of FGMRES: it
either
1. converges to the desired tolerance,
2. correctly detects an invariant subspace, with a clear indication (H(j +
1, j) = 0 and H(1:j, 1:j) is nonsingular), or
3. gives a clear indication of failure (H(j + 1, j) 6= 0 and detected rank
deficiency of H(1:j, 1:j)).
We base FT-GMRES’ “eventual convergence” on this trichotomy property. In
the following section, we will discuss recovery strategies that FT-GMRES can
use in case of the third condition above.
6.2 Fault-Tolerant GMRES
FGMRES’ acceptance of significantly different preconditioners at each iteration
suggests modeling solver faults as “different preconditioners.” The least disrup-
tive approach for existing solvers is to use the inner-outer iteration approach.
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The outer FGMRES iteration wraps any existing solver, which is used as the
inner iteration. Any solver works, even a sparse direct method (in which case
the inner “iteration” is not actually an iterative method), an iterative method
with any or no preconditioner, or a specialized algorithm that exploits prob-
lem structure (such as an FFT or hierarchical matrix factorization). Existing
preconditioners may also be used without algorithmic modifications. We call
the resulting inner-outer iteration Fault-Tolerant GMRES. It is shown here as
Algorithm 3. Inner-outer iterations with FGMRES have been used as a kind
of iterative refinement in mixed-precision computation (see Buttari et al. [11]),
but as far as we know, this is the first time it has been used for reliability and
robustness against possibly unbounded errors.
Algorithm 3 Fault-Tolerant GMRES (FT-GMRES)
Input: Linear system Ax = b and initial guess x0
Output: Approximate solution xm for some m ≥ 0
1: r0 := b−Ax0
2: β := ‖r0‖2
3: q1 := r0/β . Unpreconditioned initial residual vector
4: for j = 1, 2, . . . until convergence do
5: Inner solve (unreliable) for zj in qj = Azj
6: vj+1 := Azj . Apply the matrix A
7: for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do . Orthogonalize
8: H(i, j) := q∗i vj+1
9: vj+1 := vj+1 − qiH(i, j)
10: end for
11: H(j + 1, j) := ‖vj+1‖2
12: Update rank-revealing decomposition of H(1:j, 1:j)
13: if H(j + 1, j) is less than some tolerance then
14: if H(1:j, 1:j) not full rank then
15: Try recovery strategies discussed in text
16: else
17: Return at end of this iteration . Discovered invariant subspace
18: end if
19: else
20: qj+1 := vj+1/H(j + 1, j)
21: end if
22: yj := argminy ‖H(1:j + 1, 1:j)y − βe1‖2
23: xj := x0 + [z1, z2, . . . , zj ]yj . Compute solution update
24: end for
The only part of FT-GMRES allowed to run unreliably is Line 5, which
invokes the inner solver. FT-GMRES expects that inner solves do most of the
work, so inner solves run in the less expensive unreliable mode. Inner solvers
need only return with a solution in finite time (see Section 4.2). That solution
may be completely wrong if errors occurrred. Within the inner solves, the matrix
A, right-hand side b, and any other inner solver data may change arbitrarily,
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and those changes need not even be transient. However, each outer iteration
of FT-GMRES must run reliably, and requires a correct version of the matrix
A, right-hand side b, and additional outer solve data (the same that FGMRES
would use).
Since FT-GMRES expects only a small number of outer iterations, inter-
spersed by longer-running inner solves, we need not store two copies (unreliable
and reliable) of A and b in memory. Instead, we can save them to a reliable
backing store, or even recompute them. If the system provides fault detection
capability, we can avoid recovering or recomputing these data if no faults oc-
curred, or even selectively recover or recompute just the corrupted parts of the
critical data. If the inner solve itself knows that no errors occurred, it could
also aggressively continue improving the solution before returning to the outer
iteration; we leave this option for future work.
One practical point is that the outer iteration must scan the result of each
inner solve for invalid floating-point values (NaN and Inf), and replace any with
valid values. The latter need not be correct – for example, they may be random
numbers, or (better) averages of their neighbors with respect to the matrix
structure. Many iterative methods perform this scan already for incomplete
factorization preconditioning, since there often is no way to know in advance
that the incomplete factors are nonsingular.
Line 15 of Algorithm 3 covers the case where the outer iteration appears
to have converged, but the current upper Hessenberg matrix is rank deficient.
This can happen in FGMRES as well, even with no faults. There, it indicates an
unlucky combination of preconditioner applications. In the case of FT-GMRES,
that unlucky combination may have occurred due to faults. One of the following
recovery strategies may be appropriate:
1. retry the current iteration starting from Line 5 inclusive;
2. retry the current iteration after Line 5, but replace zj with a random
vector (scaled appropriately according to best estimates of ‖A−1‖); or
3. stop and return xj−1, the last good approximate solution.
In parallel, all these strategies require agreement between processors, and there-
fore global communication. However, the processors have to agree anyway
whether to continue iterating based on the convergence criterion, so no ad-
ditional communication is needed. In our numerical experiments discussed in
Section 8, we found the rank-deficient upper Hessenberg case to be rare.
Another feature of the inner-outer iteration approach is that we can reuse
information from previous inner iterations, if we know somehow that they
were error-free. For example, we could use a Krylov basis recycling technique
and restart, or simply keep the previous iteration’s data and continue without
restarting (for an (F)GMRES inner iteration). Thus, the implementation can
use whatever information about errors is available, though it does not require
this information.
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6.3 Inexact Krylov as an analysis tool
Inexact Krylov methods allow solving Ax = b by using successive approximations
Ak of A. This makes them a generalization of flexible methods, since the matrix,
as well as the preconditioner, may change in every iteration. For overviews and
development of convergence theory, see Simonici and Szyld [40] and van den
Eshof and Sleijpen [44]. These methods convergence when the error between
the actual matrix A and each approximation Ak respects a varying bound. The
bound starts small, but grows inversely as a function of the current residual
norm. Inexact Krylov methods are motivated by applications where computing
A itself is prohibitively expensive, but computing w = Av for a vector v can be
done approximately, and more effort in the approximation results in less error.
Inexact Krylov methods cannot be used to provide tolerance against arbi-
trary data and computational faults when applying the matrix A. This is be-
cause they require an error bound which is usually not as large as many possible
bit flips. (Bit flips may occur in exponent bits as well as sign and significand
bits.) Furthermore, if a fault in applying A results in an error which is larger
than the current bound, inexact Krylov methods cannot promise convergence.
Nevertheless, inexact Krylov offers a framework for analyzing FGMRES conver-
gence. If a reliability model lets us control and bound inner solves’ errors, we
can use this framework.
Inexact Krylov methods also give insight into where to focus reliability ef-
forts. For example, convergence of inexact GMRES depends more on orthog-
onality of the basis vectors than convergence of standard GMRES [40]. This
suggests spending more effort on basis vector reliability than on reliability of
the matrix and preconditioner. Furthermore, the inexact Krylov framework sug-
gests that the matrix A and preconditioner(s) should be applied more reliably
in initial iterations, if possible. This coincides with our informal experimental
observation that perturbing the matrix A affects convergence of iterative solvers
more in earlier iterations than in later iterations.
7 Programming model details
When we presented the FT-GMRES algorithm in Section 6, we declared few as-
sumptions about the reliability programming model. The algorithm needs few;
the “sandbox” model (Section 4.2) suffices for correctness, and maps naturally
to inner-outer iterations in general. However, existing computer systems require
few modifications to offer a richer model, which can also help us implement FT-
GMRES more efficiently. In this section, we describe a programming model that
is both suited for FT-GMRES, and is reasonable for systems architects to imple-
ment. This model promises reliable data and computations within the specified
time and space bounds, and provides best-effort fault detection outside those
bounds. It includes schemes for efficient local recovery of possibly corrupted
data. We were able to implement a representative subset of this model for our
performance prototype (Section 11) with reasonable effort.
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In Section 7.1, we show how the data in FT-GMRES and analogous methods
naturally separate into categories based on required reliability, and the amount
of time and memory it consumes. Section 7.2 explains why we assume only best-
effort fault detection, though better fault detection guarantees could improve
performance. In Section 7.3, we describe how the FT-GMRES algorithm itself,
plus best-effort fault detection, lead to a two-stage recovery scheme for corrupted
data. This scheme makes approximate repairs in inner iterations, and performs
preferably local full recovery of corrupted data in outer iterations.
Throughout this section, we refer to the subset of the model we implemented
for the performance experiments discussed in Section 11. This system currently
only handles detected but uncorrectible DRAM memory faults, not other kinds
of faults such as incorrect arithmetic or corrupted MPI messages. This restric-
tion was convenient for developing a prototype in reasonable time. We argue
in Section 7.5 that a system that considers only memory faults nevertheless
includes the right programming model elements for developing algorithms that
can handle all kinds of faults. Finally, Section 7.6 proposes that our model is
sufficiently general that it could work for other numerical methods based on
subspace search and fixed-point iteration.
7.1 Which data reliable, when
In this section, we explain which data in our fault-tolerant iterative method we
allow to experience faults, and when in the algorithm we allow those faults to
occur. In particular, we allow faults in all “large” data and computations in the
inner iterations only. “Large” data includes sparse matrices, preconditioners,
and vectors, but does not include the small projected linear system or least-
squares problem used to compute the solution update coefficients, nor does it
include code or control data such as loop indices. We also explain which of
the large data require occasional recovery to their original uncorrupted state.
Finally, we argue that this programming model could apply to other Krylov
subspace methods, and to subspace search and fixed-point iterations in general.
7.1.1 “Large” and “small” data
Krylov methods for solving linear systems spend most of their memory and
time computing with two kinds of objects: “large” dense vectors, and linear
operators (functions from a vector to a vector) of the same dimension(s). The
latter include sparse matrices (where the function is sparse matrix-vector mul-
tiplication), linear operators implemented as a subroutine (e.g., by discretizing
and solving a partial differential equation) rather than as a sparse matrix, and
preconditioners (if applicable).
Krylov methods project a larger linear system onto a smaller linear system
or least-squares problem which is inexpensive to solve using either dense fac-
torizations, or an equivalent small number of scalar computations. This gives
us a subjective but practical definition of “large” data: using a Krylov method
to solve a linear system of that size saves time, memory, or both, relative to
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a dense factorization. Krylov methods also include “small” data: scalars or
small dense matrices and vectors which represent the projected linear system
or least-squares problem. The projected problem is used to solve for the coef-
ficients of the solution update. The projected problem requires little memory
or solution time computed with the large vectors and operators. Its small size
makes it sensitive to corrupted data or computations, yet the resulting solution
update coefficients have a large effect on the accuracy of the computed solution
vector. Thus, we require that the projected problem be stored and computed
reliably, and confine any unreliable data or computation to the large vectors
and operators.
7.1.2 Both operators and vectors may be unreliable
The large matrix A and preconditioner(s) typically take up much more mem-
ory than a single vector or corresponding size. Also, applying the matrix or
a preconditioner to a vector takes more time than computing a single vector
operation (such as a norm, inner product, or vector sum). However, the balance
of time and memory between operator applications and vector operations varies
between Krylov methods. For example, our inner solver uses GMRES (the Gen-
eralized Minimal Residual method [37]), which may spend more of its time in
vector operations, depending on the restart length. Thus, we allow vectors as
well as operators in the inner solver to be unreliable, since otherwise the solver
might require too much unreliable data and computation. The goal is for a
fault-tolerant solver to spend most of its time and memory in unreliable mode.
7.2 Best-effort fault detection
We pessimistically assume best-effort fault detection. This means that a signif-
icant fraction of faults might evade detection. We assume this in part due to
technical limitations of our software prototype. Currently, it can only detect
injected faults by simulating an ECC memory “patrol scrubber” in software,
using a separate, asynchronously executing thread. Injected faults encountered
by user code’s actual memory operations are not detected. This is because the
current version of Linux, on which our software prototype depends, kills any
user process whose memory operations encounter an uncorrectable fault. (It
need not do this for faults detected by an actual patrol scrubber.) Changing
this behavior would require a custom Linux patch, which in turn would pro-
hibit us from running tests on computers we do not administer. Many other
operating systems have this property.
Despite this technical limitation of our prototype, we believe that our pes-
simistic assumption is reasonable in production systems. For example, most
current systems offer no hardware detection of arithmetic faults. Without ex-
pensive hardware replication, the best a system could do is insert occasional
test instructions into the instruction stream. This would be mostly likely to
detect “sticky” arithmetic faults, but not transient ones. Detection might also
be asynchronous, so that faults contaminate other computations irreversibly
21
before the system detects and reports them to the application. For instance,
a hardware ECC memory patrol scrubber might discover uncorrectable corrup-
tion in a sparse matrix entry while the Krylov method is doing something else.
Future systems may not necessarily promise anything about the delivery time
of the resulting error report. Finally, fault detection does cost energy and / or
performance. Our algorithm does not require infallible fault detection for cor-
rectness, so we are willing to relax this, as long as system architects can meet
our reliability demands.
7.3 Repair of corrupted data
7.3.1 How Krylov methods use operators
Krylov methods for solving linear systems use “large” linear operators in two
different ways. The first way is iterative: the method repeatedly applies the
operator(s) to a vector, in order to build up one or more search spaces. The
theory of inexact Krylov methods says that the operators need not be applied
exactly at all iterations in order for the method to converge. We take this
as inspiration for allowing these operator applications to vary arbitrary, due to
unreliability. The second way is for computing the residual vector of the current
approximate solution explicitly. The residual vector may then be used to verify
the approximate solution, restart the iteration, or improve the solution in an
outer iteration. These uses of the residual vector require an exact computation,
not an approximation, using just the matrix A and right-hand side b. Techniques
like iterative refinement even require computing the residual vector in higher
precision, in order for certain convergence results to hold.
Constructing the operators always happens outside of the Krylov method.
Construction may be a complicated operation consuming a significant part of the
application’s total run time, and many more lines of code than the linear solver.
(Consider a structural dynamics application using the finite element method,
for example.) It is usually a nonlocal operation as well: that is, it requires
communication when running in parallel in a distributed-memory environment.
(For example, in the finite element method, assembling elements with mesh
points owned by different processors requires summing contributions from the
involved processors.) However, the operators usually do not change or need
expensive reconstruction during the Krylov method.
Note that solving linear systems with a Krylov method often requires an
effective preconditioner. Preconditioners can be time-consuming to compute,
and this computation often requires global communication. Algebraic multigrid
is a good example. The only difference between a preconditioner and the matrix
A is that for GMRES variants, a left preconditioner is not needed in order to
compute a residual vector. Many GMRES users prefer a right preconditioner
anyway, since it ensures that the projected least-squares problem’s solution has
the same residual norm as the approximate solution, in exact arithmetic. GM-
RES requires the right preconditioner in order to compute the approximate so-
lution or current residual vector; thus, computing these vectors reliably requires
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applying the right preconditioner reliably.
7.3.2 What this says about operator recovery
The above two paragraphs say that (a) a fault-tolerant Krylov method must
be able to apply operators both reliably and unreliably, and (b) construct-
ing an operator is expensive and nonlocal. This suggests that a fault-tolerant
Krylov method must be able to recover the original operators reliably, and that
this recovery should not require recomputing the affected operator. We sug-
gest implementing this using a local checkpointing scheme, which saves matrix
and preconditioner data that may experience memory faults to reliable backing
storage. We already assume that FT-GMRES marks this data as unreliable,
and that FT-GMRES notifies the system on entry to each inner iteration that
faults are allowed. The checkpointing mechanism need only pay attention to
these notifications to decide when and what to checkpoint. The reliable backing
store should be fast, nonvolatile, and local to each node. Recent projections for
exascale-class systems predict much heavier use of node-local scratch storage
(see e.g., [25, Section 5.6.3.1]). We expect, therefore, that future supercomput-
ers will include node-local solid-state drives, meant for scratch storage or as a
cache for input / output operations. We currently lack access to such hardware,
so as a proxy, we implemented for this paper a reliable backing store using ordi-
nary DRAM memory in which we do not allow detected but uncorrectible ECC
faults (see Section 11).
7.3.3 Krylov basis vectors
We did not mention the Krylov basis vectors computed by the inner iteration in
the paragraphs above. These vectors result from applying a possibly corrupted
matrix or preconditioner; they are “corrupted by construction.” Thus, it does
not make sense to save or restore them. Vectors computed by the outer iteration
should be completely reliable, however. Corruption of Krylov basis vectors in
the outer iteration may result in an incorrect solution.
7.3.4 Local and approximate recovery
Local recovery is important. Faults like bit flips in memory and incorrect arith-
metic are local to the node (or even to the CPU). Recomputation of an operator
typically involves global communication, whose pattern of dependencies typi-
cally make it a heavyweight global synchronization point. As supercomputers
grow towards exascale, the increasing cost of communication makes favoring lo-
cal operations more and more attractive. The checkpointing scheme mentioned
above offers an exact local recovery method. If the system offers reliable de-
tection of data corruption, including fault locations, approximate local repair is
possible. As we explain in Section 11, existing ECC memory hardware provides
this information to the operating system upon encountering an uncorrectible
error. The application can then define a handler that repairs the fault. For
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example, a corrupted sparse matrix entry can be “smoothed out” by replacing
it with the average of its neighbors. Simple handlers cost little more than the
system interrupt caused by the fault itself.
Approximate repair is an inexpensive option for inner iterations. However,
outer iterations require exact recovery of operators. Since corrupted data lo-
cations are unknown in advance, restoring the operators requires either full
local checkpointing, or global recomputation. This suggests a two-fold recovery
strategy. Start each inner iteration with the correct sparse matrix and precon-
ditioner(s), but allow data corruption to occur. If possible, try to fix corrupted
values during the inner iteration, but do so only locally, and as quickly as pos-
sible, even if that means the values are only recovered approximately. Quick
fixes minimize the idle time of other processors which did not experience data
corruption. Local fixing avoids communication overhead in the performance-
critical inner iteration. At the end of the inner iteration, refresh the correct
values in the sparse matrix, even if no faults were detected there. This ensures
correctness even if undetected faults occurred. Perform the outer iteration, and
continue. Since we expect outer iterations to occur infrequently, we can afford
to spend more there on recovery than in inner iterations.
7.4 Summary of model
The above discussion implies three tiers of data and computation:
1. Always reliable data, such as the projected linear system, code, and control
data (e.g., loop indices).
2. Data which may be unreliable in inner phases, must be reliable in outer
phases, and which the outer iteration must be able to refresh to correct
values. Examples: the matrix, preconditioner(s), and right-hand side of
the linear system Ax = b to solve.
3. Unreliable data which does not require saving or restoring, such as the
Krylov basis vectors in inner iterations.
7.5 Memory faults are sufficient
The performance prototype of FT-GMRES we describe in this work was de-
signed to handle faults in DRAM memory. Computer hardware may also ex-
perience corrupted caches or registers, arithmetic computations, or messages
between processors. (This paper only considers faults that result in corrupted
data; other fault-tolerance techniques apply to events like dropped messages or
crashed nodes.) Nevertheless, we think that that the above programming model,
and our fault-tolerant inner-outer iteration approach, apply more generally to
all kinds of faults.
Floating-point arithmetic faults differ from memory faults, in that there is
no storage location to recover to an original value. Thus, bounding them in
space is impossible. Local fault recovery doesn’t make sense, because there is
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no storage location to recover. However, bounding them in time is possible; one
can use any of various hardware or software approaches (e.g., triple modular
redundancy) to do so. Furthermore, a reliable outer iteration can correct the
effects of arithmetic faults in inner iterations, using an algorithmic approach.
Thus, our solver could be easily made tolerant of floating-point arithmetic faults
as well.
The possibility of corrupted distributed-memory messages would violate the
principle our model assumes, namely that faults are local. However, corrupted
messages can be changed from a global to a local issue by using error-correcting
codes. Message-passing hardware often does this anyway. Such codes enable the
receiver of a corrupted message to recover its original contents without commu-
nication. Since the latency of sending messages over a network is slow anyway
compared with computation, it is worthwhile paying the computational and
message bandwidth cost of an error correction scheme. Furthermore, we can
model some kinds of corrupted messages (for example, when computing a dis-
tributed sparse matrix-vector multiply) as transient corruption of the operator.
Iterative methods do require that stopping criteria (which are global Boolean
decisions) be computed reliably. See [8, 9] for a discussion of this issue in the
context of heterogeneous compute nodes. In practice, making stopping criteria
robust has little performance penalty.
7.6 Our model applies to other numerical methods
Other numerical algorithms besides Krylov methods involve inner-outer itera-
tions based on repeatedly applying operators to vectors. Newton’s method and
its variants for solving nonlinear equations are one example. In this case, the
repeated linear solves form the inner iterations. Practical implementations of
Newton’s method typically expect some inner iterations to go awry, and ensure
eventual convergence at the outer level using trust region techniques. In this
case, the operators and vectors in the linear solves may experience occasional
data or arithmetic faults. The outer solves’ residual, line search, and trust region
computations must be reliable.
Fixed-point iterations such as Picard iteration, so-called “stationary itera-
tive methods” like Schwarz domain decomposition, or even iterative refinement
are other examples of inner-outer iterations based on repeated applications of
operators to vectors. Depending on the algorithm, these may or may not have
guarantees of eventual convergence in the presence of occasional faults. Never-
theless, in practice, the algorithms may still converge despite faults, so it would
be worthwhile exploring adding the fault model to them.
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8 Numerical experiments
We began our experiments by prototyping solvers and a fault injection frame-
work in MATLAB.3 We used these to compare the convergence of FT-GMRES,
restarted GMRES, and nonrestarted GMRES, for various fault rates in the in-
ner solves’ sparse matrix-vector multiplies (SpMVs). For these experiments,
we allowed only SpMV operations to experience faults, and did not apply pre-
conditioning. Our performance prototype experiments described in Section 11
include preconditioning, and allow faults anywhere in the inner solves.
Our initial experiments show that FT-GMRES can often converge even when
the majority of the inner solves’ SpMVs suffer faults. The other methods tested
either did not converge, or converged much more slowly than FT-GMRES, when
some of their SpMVs were faulty. Furthermore, FT-GMRES’ convergence ex-
hibits the desired gradual degradation behavior as the fault rate increases. Sec-
tion 8.1 describes our framework for numerical experiments, and the test prob-
lems and actual experiments we tried. We present results in Section 8.2.
8.1 Experimental framework
Our MATLAB prototype can inject faults either in the result of an SpMV, or
an entire inner solve (for FT-GMRES). It decides deterministically whether to
inject a fault, by using a repeating infinite sequence of Boolean values that we
specify. Each “possibly faulty” operation reads the current Boolean value from
the sequence, and if it is true, we add 1 to the first entry of the result of the
operation (imitating [22]). For example, when running FT-GMRES with faulty
SpMV operations, if the sequence is 0, 0, 1, then every third SpMV operation
in the inner solve is faulty. Deterministic faults make it easy to reproduce
experimental results. They also let us control which SpMV operations fail. (This
is important because the theory of inexact Krylov methods (see Section 6.3)
suggests that inaccurate matrix-vector products or preconditioner applications
in the first few iterations matter more than in later iterations. We plan to
explore this more in future work.)
Our MATLAB versions of GMRES and FT-GMRES do extra work for ro-
bustness. After invoking a possibly unreliable operation (either an SpMV or an
inner solve), they scan the output vector for invalid floating-point values (Inf
or NaN), and replace those with random data. Also, after orthogonalization,
they check whether the norm of the resulting orthogonalized vector is an invalid
floating-point value. If it is, they replace it with random data and reorthogo-
nalize.4 Finally, we found that FT-GMRES converges faster if the first inner
solve is successful. We implemented extra reliability for the first inner solve in a
realistic way as follows. If the first inner solve did not reduce the residual norm
3MATLAB R©is a registered trademark of The MathWorks, Inc. We used MATLAB version
7.6.0.324 (R2008a).
4Randomization improves robustness in practice, but makes reproducing experiments more
difficult. We used MATLAB’s default Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator,
with the default seed.
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Name # rows # nz κ(A)
Diagonal 10,000 10,000 1.00e+10
Szczerba/ 20,896 191,368 4.85e+09
Ill Stokes
Sandia/ 25,187 193,216 1.99e+14
mult dcop 03
Table 1: Test problems for FT-GMRES numerical experiments. The “name”
(except for “Diagonal”) comes from the University of Florida Sparse Matrix
Collection. “# rows” gives the number of rows (and columns) in the matrix,
“# nz” the number of stored sparse matrix entries, and “κ(A)” an (estimate of,
via MATLAB’s condest) the matrix’s condition number to 3 significant figures.
at all, we try it once more. If that still did not reduce the residual norm, we
replace the result of the first inner solve with the identity operator and continue.
We include this only for the first outer iteration of FT-GMRES. In practice, our
experiments rarely needed to retry the first inner solve.
We performed three sets of numerical experiments. First, for a given linear
system and fault sequence, we compared the convergence of (a) FT-GMRES,
with s−k+1 iterations per inner solve at outer iteration k, for a total of t outer
iterations (k = 1, . . . , t); (b) restarted GMRES, with s iterations per restart
cycle and t restart cycles; and (c) GMRES without restarting, s · t iterations.
Decreasing the number of iterations per inner solve in FT-GMRES makes com-
paring an inner-outer iteration and a restarted method fair, by ensuring that
both methods store the same number of left Krylov basis vectors [34]. We in-
clude nonrestarted GMRES just to show its lack of robustness in the presence
of faults. For this set, we fixed s = 50, to simulate the fixed-time requirement
for inner solves. We set t = 10 so that s · t nonrestarted GMRES iterations
would complete in a reasonable time. Second, we tested only FT-GMRES with
the same linear system, but with different fault rates. This set will show the
desired gradual degradation of FT-GMRES’s convergence with respect to the
fault rate. Here, we set s−k+1 iterations per inner solve with s = 50 as before,
but performed more outer iterations (t = 20), since we did not have to run s · t
iterations of nonrestarted GMRES. In the third set, we tested FT-GMRES for
many outer iterations t = 300 and a fixed number s = 50 of iterations per in-
ner solve, and varied the outer solves’ convergence tolerance and the fault rate.
This will show that computational cost does not increase much as the fault rate
increases.
We tested three types of matrices in our experiments: diagonal with positive
entries with base-10 logarithmic spacing from 1 to 10−10, nonsymmetric matrices
from discretizations of partial differential equations (PDEs), and nonsymmetric
circuit simulation matrices. Our matrices from the latter two categories come
from the University of Florida Sparse Matrix Collection (UFSMC) [15]. Table
1 names and describes the test problems. “Diagonal” is a diagonal matrix,
27
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
102
Outer iteration number
Re
lat
ive
 re
sid
ua
l 2
−n
or
m
 (l
og
 sc
ale
)
Fault−Tolerant GMRES, restarted GMRES, and nonrestarted GMRES 
(deterministic faulty SpMVs in inner solves)                  
 
 
FT−GMRES(50,10)
GMRES(50), 10 restart cycles
GMRES(500)
Figure 2: FT-GMRES vs. GMRES on Diagonal.
Ill Stokes comes from a discretization of Stokes’ equation, and mult dcop 03
comes from a circuit simulation. Each UFSMC matrix includes a sample right-
hand side from its application. For “Diagonal,” we chose the exact solution x
as a vector of ones, and computed the right-hand side b via b = A · x.
8.2 Results
Figures 2, 3, and 4 compare FT-GMRES (50 iterations per inner solve, 10 inner
solves) with restarted GMRES (50 iterations per restart cycle, 10 restart cycles)
and nonrestarted GMRES (500 = 50 · 10 iterations). Every first and third out
of 10 SpMVs in GMRES, and in FT-GMRES’ inner solves, are faulty. In all
cases, FT-GMRES converges faster than the other two methods, and faults
cause restarted GMRES to stagnate or converge more slowly than FT-GMRES.
Nonrestarted GMRES’ residual norm often fails to be monotonic. Figures 5, 6,
and 7 show only FT-GMRES (50 iterations per inner solve, 20 inner solves), with
different fault rates for SpMV operations in the inner solves: no faults, 1 out of
10, 3 out of 10, and 5 out of 10 SpMVs faulty.5 We found that increasing the
fault rate only decreases the FT-GMRES convergence rate gradually. Finally,
Figure 8 shows that, barring one outlier, the number of outer iterations to attain
a given convergence rate increases little as the fault rate increases.
5In the 1 out of 10 case, only the tenth of every ten is faulty. The 3 out of 10 case uses the
pattern 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, and the 5 out of 10 case 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1.
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Figure 3: FT-GMRES vs. GMRES on Ill Stokes.
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Figure 4: FT-GMRES vs. GMRES on mult dcop 03.
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Figure 5: FT-GMRES on Diagonal problem, with different fault rates in inner
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Figure 6: FT-GMRES on Ill Stokes problem, with different fault rates in inner
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Figure 8: Number of outer iterations to convergence for FT-GMRES (50 it-
erations per inner solve, max 300 outer iterations) on mult dcop 03 problem,
vs. fault rate in the inner solves’ SpMVs, and the outer solves’ convergence
tolerance.
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/* Register callback for handling failure in a specific
* allocation of failable memory at a specified byte offset
* and length. arg is an opaque user-supplied argument. */
typedef void (*memfail_callback_t)( void *allocation,
size_t offset,
size_t len,
void *arg);
void memfail_recover_init( memfail_callback_t cb, void *arg );
/* Mark resp. unmark memory as "failable" that was allocated
with malloc(). Such memory should be freed with free(). */
void * malloc_failable( size_t len );
void free_failable( void *addr );
Figure 9: Application / Library interface to handle DRAM memory failures
9 Application / OS interface
This section describes the interface between the application and the operating
system that implements a subset of the fault detection and recovery model
described in Section 7. In Section 9.1, we present the interface itself. Section
9.2 outlines the implementation of this interface. Finally, we explain in Section
9.3 our technique for injecting artificial faults, which we use to test both the
interface and also our FT-GMRES performance prototype. We describe fault
detection separately from fault injection, in order to emphasize that our fault
detection interface can work for actual memory faults as well as those which the
injection framework described in Section 9.3 injects.
Our fault detection interface between the system and the application sup-
ports both actual and artificially injected memory faults. This means that the
FT-GMRES implementation is ready for use with existing hardware and ap-
plications. However, the implementation of the system-application interface
currently depends on artificial fault injection in order to be implemented in
user space on Linux. Removing this limitation is technically possible, but re-
quires operating system modifications, which prevents us from running tests on
computers we do not administer. We leave this for future work.
9.1 Design
We have designed an application / operating system (OS) interface to support
the fault and recovery models described in Section 7, and implemented a library
to provide this interface. Our key design goals were to provide a simple inter-
face for applications and algorithmic libraries, and to support existing OS-level
interfaces to handling memory errors such as those provided by Linux.
This application level of this interface, shown in Figure 9, focuses on marking
or unmarking contiguous memory regions that were allocated at run time using
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malloc(). In particular, the interface provides the application with separate
calls for marking or unmarking allocations as failable memory – that is, memory
in which failures will cause notifications to be sent to the application, rather
than the usual fail-stop behavior of killing the application. In addition, the
application also registers a callback with the library. The callback is called once
for every active allocation when the library is notified by the OS of a detected
but uncorrected memory fault in that allocation.
In addition to this interface, we also provide a simple producer-consumer
bounded ring buffer that the application can use to queue up a sequence of
failed allocations when signaled by the library. This ring buffer is non-blocking
and atomic to allow asynchronous callbacks from the library to enqueue failed
allocations that will be fully recovered at the end of an iteration. The application
determines the size of this buffer when it is allocated; the number of entries
needed must be sufficient to cover all of the allocations that could plausibly fail
during a single iteration. For applications with relatively few failable allocations,
this should be a minimal number of entries.
At the OS level, the library first notifies the operating system that it wishes
to receive notifications of DRAM failures, either in general or in specific areas
of its virtual address space depending upon the interface provided by the op-
erating system. Second, the library keeps track of the list of failable memory
allocated by the application so that it can call the application callback for each
failed allocation when necessary. Finally, the library handles any error notifica-
tions from the operating system (e.g., using a Linux SIGBUS signal handler) and
performs OS-specific actions to clear a memory error from a page of memory if
necessary prior to notifying the application of the error.
9.2 Implementation
We added support for handling signaled memory failures as described in the
previous section to an existing incremental checkpointing library for Linux, lib-
hashckpt [16]. The library also helps track application memory usage, and
provides checkpointing functionality to recover from memory failures for ap-
plications that cannot. Its ability to trap specific memory accesses eases the
testing of simulated memory failures, as described later in Section 9.3. Future
work may include using libhashckpt to implement efficient local save and restore
of failable data. We modified libhashckpt to add the application API calls listed
previously in Figure 9, with routines to mark or unmark memory as failable.
This allocator also keeps a data structure sorted by allocation address of failable
memory allocations.
Our fault detection system assumes that when the memory controller de-
tects an error which ECC cannot correct, the controller notifies the operating
system using a signal that indicates which cache line in which memory page
failed. Linux notifies the library of DRAM memory failures, particularly fail-
ures caught by the memory scrubber using a SIGBUS signal that indicates the
address of the memory page which failed. The library then unmaps this failed
page using munmap(), maps in a new physical page using mmap(), and calls the
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application-registered callback with appropriate offset and length arguments for
every failable application allocation that overlapped with the page that included
the failure.
Note that Linux currently only notifies the application of DRAM failures
detected by the memory scrubber. When the memory controller raises an ex-
ception caused by the application attempting to consume faulty data, Linux
currently kills the faulting application. In addition, Linux only notifies appli-
cations of the page that failed and expects the application to discard the entire
failed page. This approach is overly restrictive in some cases, as the hardware
notifies the kernel of the memory bus line that failed, and some memory errors
are soft and could be corrected simply by rewriting the failed memory line. This
is not a limitation of the interface, but of the Linux operating system itself.
9.3 Fault injection
To provide support for testing DRAM memory failures, we added support to the
incremental checkpointing library for simulating memory failures. In particular,
we added code that randomly injects errors at a configurable rate into the ap-
plication address space and uses page protection mechanisms, i.e., mprotect(),
to signal the application with a SIGSEGV when it touches a page to which a
simulated failure has been injected. The library then catches SIGSEGV and pro-
ceeds as if it had received a memory failure on the protected page. We model
the occurrence of faults with a Poisson distribution, with a user-specified rate
(faults per MB per hour). We model fault locations with a uniform distribution
over all failable memory regions (i.e., those under control of our fault detection
system). Faults that would occur in memory not currently marked failable are
not injected.
We also implemented a software simulation of a memory “patrol scrubber”
in the library. The software scrubber can asynchronously inject memory failures
into the application by signaling the library when it scrubs a memory location
at which a failure has been simulated. For each MPI process, we start a thread
for injection. Every millisecond, that thread wakes up. (We use the POSIX Re-
altime Extension’s nanosleep() method to implement low-overhead sleeping.)
The thread computes the number of faults that should have been injected since
the last time the thread woke up, and then injects that many faults. Thus,
fault occurrence “discretizes” the Poisson distribution, rather than obeying it
exactly. Waking up the injection thread at longer intervals reduces its perfor-
mance impact.
10 Performance prototype
In this section, we describe the implementation details of our performance pro-
totype of FT-GMRES. We call it a performance prototype because while it may
lack some features of a production-ready implementation, we expect it to have
comparable performance. In particular, our solver uses the same linear algebra
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computational kernels and data structures as other production-ready iterative
solvers. We made only minimal modifications to the linear algebra objects in
order to support a fault-tolerant programming model; see the rest of this sec-
tion for details. Using the same linear algebra objects means that when we
turn off fault injection and detection, our implementation has the same perfor-
mance characteristics as that of any other iterative solver in Trilinos. Second,
our solver gains all the features of the linear algebra library “for free”: in this
case, hybrid distributed- and shared-memory parallelism. Third, we can exploit
libraries that use the linear algebra objects in order to use our solver in a more
realistic way. For example, our performance results in Section 11 use a nontriv-
ial incomplete factorization preconditioner, and we can inject and detect faults
in the preconditioner as well. Our solver even has the same interface as other
iterative solvers in Trilinos, so it may even be embedded in a real application
without code changes.
We call our implementation a “prototype” because it does not attempt to
handle all the kinds of hardware faults that we think the FT-GMRES algorithm
could handle, given the right system support. In particular, our system library
can only intercept machine check exceptions resulting from detected but uncor-
rectible DRAM faults. Our fault injection framework only injects faults of this
kind. In Section 7.5, we argue that at least for Krylov subspace methods, bit
flips are a good model for all kinds of hardware faults, including faulty arith-
metic and corrupted messages. While our current run-time system may not be
able to handle such faults, our more general programming model can.
10.1 Implementation outline
Our prototype relies on the application / OS interface presented in Section 9.
The solver is built using components from a slightly modified version of the
Trilinos solvers framework [20]. We use the implementations of GMRES [37]
and Flexible GMRES [34] in Trilinos’ Belos package [7] for the inner resp. outer
solvers. We preconditioned the inner iterations using the implementation of the
ILUT preconditioner [35] in Trilinos’ Ifpack2 package [46]. All of these algo-
rithms use the hybrid-parallel (threads + MPI) distributed sparse matrix and
dense vector objects provided by Trilinos’ Tpetra package [4, 5]. Implementing
the fault model required minor modifications to the aforementioned four Trilinos
packages, in order to demonstrate a working linear solver. These modifications
suffice to deploy FT-GMRES for use by any application that employs Trilinos’
Tpetra linear algebra stack, and the application would only interact with them
by requesting FT-GMRES as the solver. Our entire solver prototype required
only about 3000 lines of code, not including the minor Trilinos modifications.
10.2 The Failable interface
In order for FT-GMRES to control reliability of the inner and outer solves, we
modified Trilinos to make all the large linear algebra objects that the solver users
– the sparse matrix A, the preconditioner, and vectors – implement a Failable
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abstract interface. The Failable interface has methods for marking, unmarking,
and checking whether the object’s data are allowed to experience bit flips. FT-
GMRES mark failability of the relevant objects on entry to the inner solver, and
unmarks them on exit. We describe below how we implemented this high-level
interface using the low-level application / OS interface presented in Section 9.
Trilinos is built on the Petra framework of distributed linear algebra ob-
jects. Petra has two implementations: Epetra (Essential Petra), and Tpetra
(Templated Petra). We use only Tpetra for our prototype, because Tpetra’s
intranode parallel support library, Kokkos [6], has the necessary features to
support our desired programming model. In particular, Kokkos allows us to
intercept allocation and deallocation of large memory arrays, called compute
buffers. Linear algebra objects such as sparse matrices, vectors, and precon-
ditioners use compute buffers exclusively to store data on which they plan to
execute parallel kernels. This lets us restrict where memory faults may occur,
with minimal changes to the code of affected linear algebra objects. Kokkos also
handles intranode parallelism in a generic way that encompasses both multicore
CPU and GPU-based hardware. (In fact, this is why Kokkos needs control
of memory allocation; it may need to place data on a GPU or other accelera-
tor with a separate memory space from the CPU.) This lets our FT-GMRES
prototype use hybrid parallelism (MPI and a threading library of our choice)
without additional effort. Our software prototype currently works with multiple
CPU-based threading libraries; we do not currently have GPU fault detection
or injection capability, but this could be added at the level of the application /
OS interface without changing our Trilinos modifications.
We first extended the Kokkos interface to support marking or unmarking a
compute buffer as “failable.” This operation directly invokes the application /
OS interface discussed in Section 9. Our Kokkos extension gives us two ways
to mark failability. We may either mark or unmark all subsequent allocations
of compute buffers of a particular type (e.g., double) as failable, or mark or
unmark a particular compute buffer. The first option lets us experiment with
faults in Tpetra-based libraries without modifying their code. (For example,
we can compute the sparse matrix A reliably, then intercept final assembly so
that the matrix data are stored unreliably.) The second option – marking each
buffer individually – lets us extend Tpetra linear algebra objects to implement
the Failable interface.
We then made Tpetra sparse matrices (CrsMatrix) and dense vectors (Mul-
tiVector) implement the Failable interface. Just like compute buffers, Failable
objects may be marked or unmarked failable. Certain data in the object may
experience memory faults only if the object is currently marked failable. Mark-
ing a Failable object consisting of compute buffers means marking some of its
compute buffers. The object’s implementation gets to control which compute
buffers may experience faults. For example, our sparse matrices only mark their
entries, not the sparsity structure. We can also compose more complicated Fail-
able objects out of simpler Failable objects. For example, an ILUT incomplete
factorization preconditioner consists of two sparse matrices (the L and U fac-
tors); marking the preconditioner failable means marking the L and U factors
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accordingly. We modified Ifpack2’s ILUT preconditioner in this way. Finally,
we added an option to Belos’ GMRES solver, whether to allow memory faults
in its Krylov basis vectors. This option was enabled for inner solves in all of
our performance experiments in Section 11. By analogy, this makes GMRES
implement Failable.
10.3 Proxy for local checkpointing
FT-GMRES needs to recover the correct the sparse matrix and preconditioner
after exit of each inner solve. We implement this using a local checkpointing
scheme for failable data in the sparse matrix and preconditioner, as we men-
tioned in Section 7. We only save the sparse matrix values, not the sparsity
structure, since we only allow the values to experience memory faults. Since we
do not currently have a test machine with a reliable persistent local store, our
recovery method stores the “backup” in nonfailable memory as a proxy. This
serves as a performance upper bound. We also used this method for saving and
restoring Ifpack2’s ILUT preconditioner, since it stores its factors as Tpetra
sparse matrices. This particular preconditioner is local, so we could have just
recomputed it. However, many preconditioners are not local, and recomputing
them often requires communication. (The coarse-grid operators in algebraic
multigrid are a good example.) Moreover, recomputing the ILUT incomplete
factorization each time would be expensive.
While the application / OS interface allows us to implement local approxi-
mate repair of sparse matrix values, as described in Section 7.3, we have not yet
implemented this technique. The only repair we currently perform is to refresh
all the sparse matrix values from reliable backing store on exit from the inner
solve.
10.4 Operator wrappers
In our MATLAB-based numerical experiments (see Section 8.1), we scan the
vector output of each sparse matrix or preconditioner application for invalid
floating-point values (Inf or NaN), and replace them with random data. In our
performance prototype, we implement a similar filter. In order to allow thread-
parallel application of the filter without a thread-safe pseudorandom number
generator, we implement “repairing” the vector by replacing an invalid value
with the arithmetic mean of its nearest valid neighbors (within a fixed-size
window of neighbors). We use the Kokkos parallel framework to apply this
kernel in parallel.
11 Performance experiments
In this section, we present the results of experiments with our FT-GMRES per-
formance prototype. We demonstrate the solver working with multiple threads
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Figure 10: FT-GMRES (10 outer iterations, 50 inner iterations each), 500
iterations of non-restarted GMRES, and 10 restart cycles (50 iterations each)
of restarted GMRES. (Down is good.)
and MPI processes, using production-quality software components from the
Trilinos framework.
We tested FT-GMRES using the development (10.7) version of Trilinos, on
a Intel Xeon X5570 (8 cores, 2.93 GHz) CPU with 12 GB of main memory. We
chose for our test matrix an ill-conditioned Stokes partial differential equation
discretization Szczerba/Ill Stokes from the University of Florida Sparse Ma-
trix Collection (UFSMC) [15]. It has 25,187 rows and columns, 193,216 stored
entries, and an estimated 1-norm condition number of 4.85 × 109. For initial
experiments, we chose a uniform [−1, 1] pseudorandom right-hand side.
We ran FT-GMRES with 10 outer iterations. Each inner solve used 50 iter-
ations of standard GMRES (without restarting), right-preconditioned by ILUT
(see e.g., Saad [36]) with level 2 fill, zero drop tolerance, 1.5 relative threshold
and 0.1 absolute threshold. (These are not necessarily reasonable ILUT pa-
rameters, but they ensure a valid preconditioner for the problem tested.) We
compared FT-GMRES with standard GMRES both with and without restart-
ing: 500 iterations of each, restarting if applicable every 50 iterations. (This
makes the memory usage of the two methods approximately comparable.) We
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set no convergence criteria except for iteration counts, so that we could fully
observe the behavior of the methods. Our initial experiments use random fault
injection at a rate of 1000 faults per megabyte per hour, which is high but
demonstrates the solver’s fault-tolerance capabilities. Faults were allowed to
occur in floating-point data belonging to the matrix and the ILUT precondi-
tioner. Furthermore, to demonstrate the value of algorithmic approaches, our
restarted GMRES implementation imitated FT-GMRES by also refreshing the
matrix and ILUT preconditioner from reliable storage before every restart cycle.
(We optimized by not refreshing if no memory faults were detected.)
Figure 10 shows our convergence results. FT-GMRES’ reliable outer itera-
tion makes it able to roll forward through faults and continue convergence. The
fault-detection capabilities discussed earlier in this work let FT-GMRES refresh
unreliable data only when necessary, so that memory faults appear transient to
the solver.
12 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that our fault-tolerant iterative linear solver, FT-
GMRES, can converge despite memory faults, whereas other iterative solvers
could not. We demonstrated this both with numerical experiments using a Mat-
lab prototype, and with a performance prototype that uses realistic fault injec-
tion and detection, implemented using production-grade solver components.
Our experiments also show that FT-GMRES’ convergence rate degrades
gradually as the fault rate is increased, and that increasing the fault rate only
modestly increases the total number of iterations (and therefore the total cost).
While more experiments are needed, we think FT-GMRES and fault-tolerant
iterative methods in general have great potential to improve solver robustness
and relax hardware reliability constraints. The basic approaches we have used
can be applied to many algorithms, greatly reducing the impact of the soft faults
that are expected on future computing systems.
Our work has also opened up interesting collaborations with systems re-
searchers, to develop programming interfaces for varying reliability, reporting
faults, and selective checkpointing. These collaborations have the potential to
influence hardware-software codesign, especially at extreme scales, where en-
ergy requirements will force system designers to reduce hardware reliability and
rely more on software approaches. Fault-tolerant algorithms thus have the po-
tential to influence computer hardware in a way analogous to RISC (Reduced
Instruction Set Computer) architectures [32], by encouraging beneficial trade-
offs between hardware and software.
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